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1Multi-market Competition in Packaged Goods: Sustaining Large Local
Market Advantages with Little Product Diﬀerentiation
Abstract
Local outputs for nationally available brands of packaged goods tend to be spatially
concentrated, i.e., the same brand has high outputs in some regions, and low outputs in
others. Curiously, such spatial concentration is very persistent despite direct competition
between brands and a notable lack of product diﬀerentiation. It is shown that the stability
of spatial concentration can be explained from two realities of competing in packaged goods,
namely multi-market contact of national brand manufacturers and high local positioning
cost (e.g., advertising costs or retailer incentives). These explanations gain more weight
as the diﬀerentiation between brands diminishes. Indeed, a main result of the paper is
that when two products are undiﬀerentiated, their observed local outputs are more likely
to be asymmetric. A surprising implication of the analysis is that multi-market proﬁts
can be higher with high positioning cost than without such cost. This happens when
manufacturers have some strong and some weak markets and when positioning costs are a
deterrent to seeking a “fair” share in each local market. Positioning costs are more eﬀective
in this deterring role when products are again undiﬀerentiated. Another implication
of the main result is that ﬁrms selling undiﬀerentiated goods should focus on defend-
ing their strong markets and stay away from attacking in markets where a competitor leads.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L11, L15, L22, L66, M30, R12
21 Introduction
Consumer goods in the United States often lack meaningful product diﬀerentiation on attributes
other than brand labels (Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto 1994; Trout and Rivkin 2000). If two
products are physically identical, except perhaps for brand labels, utility maximizing consumers
should be relatively indiﬀerent between them. All else equal, therefore, demand for such brands
should be similar —or at least not systematically diﬀerent— within and across geographical markets.
However, the same national brand of repeat purchase goods often has very diﬀerent market
shares across diﬀerent local markets, even after controlling for the inﬂuence of regional or local
brands. Consider Figure 1, which shows market shares for the two largest manufacturers of brands
of Mexican salsa, Campbell and Frito-Lay. These manufacturers market the Pace and Tostitos
brands, respectively. Both brands originate in Texas and oﬀer very similar products. Within and
across markets, the two ﬁrms have very diﬀerent shares and seem to divide the domestic U.S. market
in two territories, one for each ﬁrm.1 Tostitos dominates along the East Coast, whereas Pace leads
west of the Mississippi. While market-shares are clearly not constant across markets,t h e ya r ei nf a c t
constant across time.2 Given any one market, and given the similarity of the two brands, the question
in this paper is: How is it possible that in direct competition, these ﬁrms sustain such diverse yet
persistent market divisions? Put diﬀerently, why can large local market advantages persist in the
face of little product diﬀerentiation?
I present two explanations for this puzzle. First, reciprocal local market advantages, e.g., where
all competitors have some strong —and accept some weak— markets, can be sustained as the out-
come of multi-market competition. Second, when it is costly to position as the market leader in
communication— or distribution channels, it is still possible for two physically identical products to
end up in an asymmetric equilibrium, even in a single market (i.e., without reciprocity).
With both arguments, the key contingency in this paper is that with less product diﬀerentiation,
asymmetries in competitive equilibria occur more often and — if they rely on orientation toward
future proﬁts — are more easily sustained.
Traditionally, geographic concentration of outputs and prices has been linked to geographic cost
1The pattern in Figure 1 is not exceptional. Equally concentrated patterns are observed for categories such as
ground coﬀee, margarines, and mayonnaise.
2This fact is illustrated by the fact that Figure 1 represents the annual averages of market shares for 1996, suggesting
that the diﬀerences in share are not simply due to temporary local marketing programs.
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Figure 1: Market shares of two leading manufacturers of mexican salsa
diﬀerences (see e.g., Greenhut 1981). For instance, prices can be aﬀected by the location of ﬁrms
through transportation cost (Anderson and de Palma 1992; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999).
Thus, locating oneself closer to consumers creates a cost advantage which may impact observed
outputs. In this research tradition, it is the transportation cost of ﬁrms that drives the spatial
distribution of prices and outputs.
However, the location of the manufacturers whose outputs are represented in Figure 1 was initially
similar and therefore transportation cost of ﬁrms does not to seem to explain the observed data well.
Rather than focusing on the transportation cost of ﬁrms, I focus on (1) the transportation cost of
consumers and (2) that ﬁrms compete in multiple geographic markets.
Geographic markets are deﬁned in this paper as areas without consumers overlap and without
consumer arbitrage. In other words, I use as a deﬁning characteristic of a geographic market that
consumers do not travel from one market to the next to beneﬁt from price diﬀerences across mar-
kets. This deﬁnition is particularly applicable in the domestic US with its discrete population centers
(metropolitan areas) separated by sparsely populated space. In the context of packaged goods, con-
sumer transportation cost across such markets is often high compared to the potential gains from
traveling. Although almost entirely omitted from theoretical analysis, the “no consumer arbitrage”
property of local markets is important to understanding multi-market conduct of ﬁrms. At a mini-
mum, the opposite assumption, i.e., that ﬁrms would not seek to beneﬁtf r o mt h ede facto immobility
of consumers across markets, seems lacking as a theoretical point of departure.
4Allowing ﬁrms to set diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent markets, I show that ﬁrms have an incentive
to maintain advantages that may have grown historically in some markets and accept historical
disadvantages in other markets. This incentive increases as the diﬀerentiation between products
diminishes and may lead to implicit coordination by ﬁrms across markets. Therefore, even without
transportation cost arguments and even with the same types of consumers across markets, large
market advantages can be sustained, especially in the face of little product diﬀerentiation.
This paper aims to contribute to a growing literature in economics and marketing about the
role of geography and space. In this context, the “New Economic Geography” (Fujita, Venables,
and Krugman 1999) focuses on providing answers to two fundamental questions about economic
activity. These are (1) when does spatial symmetry of economic activity break, and (2) why do
spatial asymmetries in economic activity persist. Because of the empirical observation of existing
spatial concentration in packaged goods categories, I focus in this paper on the second question.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews research that suggest consumers
take non-product attributes such as advertising and distribution as perceptual cues for product
quality. Section 3 discusses the demand model with local quality perceptions. Section 4 sets up
ﬁrm competition and establishes the basic relation between proﬁts, perceived quality and prices in a
single market framework. Section 5 analyses when asymmetries can be sustained in a multi-market
economy even when it is costless to locally reposition from low to high perceived quality.Section 6
shows how the asymmetries can be sustained when there are signiﬁcant costs to locally positioning
as a high quality ﬁrm. It also focuses on the role of retailers in sustaining spatial concentration
of outputs. Section 7 discusses and interprets the main results in the context of packaged goods.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Local determinants of consumer quality perceptions, mind— and
shelf-space.
Consumers form brand perceptions from environmental cues other than the product itself. As
Keller (1993) puts it “although the judicious choice of brand identities can contribute signiﬁcantly to
customer-based brand equity, the primary input comes from [...] the various product, price, advertis-
ing, promotion, and distribution decisions.”
Obviously, an important impetus to quality perceptions remains the physical product itself.
5However, as the quote above seems to imply, perceptual advantages for packaged goods also originate
in diﬀerences in brand awareness and brand support in the distribution channel. Corstjens and
Corstjens (1995) note that brand awareness and distribution support are frequently zero-sum “assets”
to ﬁrms because of limits on consumer information processing and on retailer shelf-space. The
premise of this paper is that brand awareness and distribution support such as shelf-space are used
by consumers as quality cues.
For instance, Kirmani and Wright (1989) ﬁnd a positive relation between advertising and ex-
pectations about product quality. It is therefore not surprising that brand awareness is often a
determinant of choice, especially for low involvement decisions (Bettman and Park 1980; Hoyer and
Brown 1990; Park and Lessig 1981).
Simonson (1993) concludes that consumers construct preferences at the point of purchase. For
packaged goods this means that preferences for diﬀerent brands are often formed at the supermarket
shelf. Shelf space allocations then aﬀect choices in at least two ways. First, consumers may take
large shelf space allocations of packaged goods as cues that those brands are popular in a given local
market. Thus, if consumers do not acquire brand information themselves (Dickson and Sawyer 1990,
Hoyer 1984), they may rely on (what they believe are) the preferences of others. Second, the spatial
arrangement of products including shelf-space allocations raise brand awareness at point of purchase
(Fazio, Powell, and Williams, 1989).
In sum, while consumers from diﬀerent markets may face the same physical product, perceptions
about the quality of these products are co-determined by local advertising and distribution strategies
of ﬁrms. It is exactly the point of this paper that even if such inﬂuences on quality perceptions are
small they can be of substantial consequence in multi-market competition.
I consider two types of perceived quality. In section 4 and 5, I use a concept of perceived quality
that is an endowment from the past. Its cost is sunk. An example is order-of-entry eﬀects on top-
of-mind awareness for brands or on favorable treatment by retailers (Bowman and Gatignon 1990;
Robinson and Fornell 1985). In section 6, perceived quality is costly.
3 A duopoly model of demand
Utility I use an address model of consumer demand. In this model, consumers h are characterized
by a position zh in a K-dimensional attribute space in RK. Whereas the consumer’s ideal point zh
6is unobserved, its distribution across h is known. Products i =1 ,2a r ed e ﬁned by a known address
zi ∈ RK in the attribute space. Consumers h have a quadratic disutility for distance between ideal
points zh and the location of products zi (d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse 1979). Utility for
brand i by household h =1 ,...,N m in market m is given by








where Yh is income of household h,a n daim is the perceived quality of a ﬁrm in given market. The
local quality attribute aim is common to all households in market m; pim is the price of the product
in market m. The scalar µ measures the consumer’s disutility of products being far away from his
ideal point. The utility model (1) thus acknowledges the presence of household, market, and brand
speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t s .
Quality perceptions As discussed previously, quality perceptions can either reﬂect historical
advantages, such as order of entry eﬀects, selective consumer learning, etc., or can be inﬂuenced by
shelf-space allocations by retailers in local markets or local advertising of the brand. Alternatively,
the quality perceptions aim can capture versions of the same product. For instance, services in the
airline industry are spatially versioned, with individual ﬁrms oﬀering more travel ﬂexibility in some
regions than in others (see e.g., Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985). However, we focus on the ﬁrst two
interpretations, i.e., market reach or historical advantages.
Product positions in the physical attribute space I assume that there is one physical attribute
zk
i (K = 1), in addition to the quality perceptions aim. This attribute is common to all consumers
and markets. To rule out a consumer-focused explanation of asymmetries, I initially assume that
the location of products and consumers is symmetric around zero. Owing to the presence of the
multiplier µ, it can be assumed without loss in generality that the position of product 1 is given by
−1
2 and of product 2 by +1
2. The diﬀerence in positions of the two products introduces horizontal
diﬀerentiation in the model.
Location of consumers in the physical attribute space The consumer ideal points zh ∈ R






Expected demand Consumers choose that alternative that maximizes their utility. Expected
7demand of product i for Nm consumers in market m is thus obtained by integrating of the utility
equation (1) over the support of product i using the consumer density of equation (2). Given the
formulation of the utility function the components Yh and z2
h, do not aﬀect choice (they are common
to both alternatives). Given the symmetric positions, the utility component z2
i (i =1 ,2) also drops
out of the utility comparisons. What remains is the interaction zhzi of the location of consumers
and products. Thus the location of the consumers enters the utility comparison as a linear term,
and hence demand is given by a logit model.










∀j exp[(ajm − pjm)/µ]
,i,j=1 ,2
In this formulation, the eﬀective degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation manifests itself as the disutility
for quadratic distance between product i and the consumer’s ideal point scale parameter of the logit,
µ. For convenience and because its role turns out to be largely passive, I arbitrarily scale Nm =1 .
The logit demand formulation has broad appeal in both theoretical (e.g., Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse 1992), as well as empirical work (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995). It is noted
that with a uniform distribution for g(z), a version of the Hotelling model obtains that is a duopoly
version of the Mussa-Rosen model. This does not change basic results in this paper.
Because I initially wish to separate multi-market contact eﬀects from demand expansion, the
standard model used here does not account for an outside good. This may be justiﬁed by realizing
that for mature categories such as coﬀee, Mexican salsas, and alike, demand expansion is small
(Nijs et al 2002). Nonetheless, it is desirable to explore the robustness of the main results to the
introduction of an outside good. Hence, after establishing several results with the standard model,
these results will be shown to generalize to the case of demand with an outside good.
4 Perceived quality, prices and proﬁts
4.1 A basic relation
Of initial interest is how perceived quality aim, aﬀects prices pim, and proﬁts πim. Firms compete
by ﬁrst simultaneously setting aim. Conditional on product positioning, ﬁrms next simultaneously
8set prices.3 Marginal cost cim and ﬁxed cost Kim are initially quality-independent and ﬁxed. Thus,
for now, ﬁrms can increase perceived quality at no additional cost. This assumption gives a strong
result. If ﬁrms do not wish to increase perceived quality to the highest attainable level in each market
even when it is costless to do so, they will not do so when attacking is expensive.4
In a two-product case, demands are give by
s1m =
exp[(a1m − p1m)/µ]
exp[(a1m − p1m)/µ]+e x p[ ( a2m − p2m)/µ]
, (4)
with s2m =1− s1m in the absence of an outside good. The proﬁt function for ﬁrm i is πim =
(pim − cim) · sim − Kim.
Given the sequence of decisions, prices are solved ﬁrst. Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1991) have shown
that a unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists for the demand system in equation (4).
Rearranging the f.o.c. for ﬁrm i
dπim
dpim
=( pim − cim) · s0
im + sim =0 , (5)
an implicit equation for the prices of interest is obtained
p∗
im − cim =
µ
1 − sim
,i =1 ,2. (6)
These price equations are implicit because the right-hand side of the expression for the markup
contains all prices, and positioning information (through sim). Using the last equation to solve for
sim and substituting in the proﬁt function gives that at optimal prices
π∗
im = p∗
im − cim − µ − Kim. (7)
Deﬁne the local positioning diﬀerence as am ≡ a1m − a2m. Two useful dependencies of local prices
(and proﬁts, given the last equation) on the positioning diﬀerential are given in the ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Prices)
1. The price of ﬁrm 1’s product is increasing in am,a n dt h ep r i c eo fﬁrm 2’s product is decreasing
in am.











3Currently these prices are to be interpreted as market prices. Later when the case of retailers is considered, the
m a n u f a c t u r e r sw i l ls e tw h o l es a l ep r i c e s .
4I later consider cases where costs depend on aim.
9Proof: see appendix A
This result states that prices for ﬁrm 1 increase as its positioning advantage over ﬁrm 2 widens.
However, if one ﬁrm improves its positioning, its equilibrium price does not rise in equal measure.
Consumers get at least part of the utility stemming from positioning improvement. For a related
result, see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), and Anderson and de Palma (2001).
Proposition 2 (Convexity) The optimal prices of both products, p∗
1m and p∗
2m are convex in their
positioning diﬀerence, am.
Proof: see appendix A
This result states that with a widening positioning gap between the two products, the marginal
eﬀect of am = a1m − a2m,m=1 ,...,M, on prices increases. Given equation (7) this result also
applies to proﬁts.
What does this result imply for multi-market proﬁts? First, ﬁrms can set aim in each market.
The convexity result then implies that both ﬁrms, competing on M markets, would prefer to have




am in each market.
In practical terms, the result therefore suggests that each ﬁrm is better oﬀ having some strong
markets paired with some weak markets rather than having many “average” markets. Both ﬁrms
therefore have an incentive to sustain uneven market-division as long as each ﬁrm has a suﬃcient
number of “strong” markets: a condition to be explored more fully in the coming sections. I now
present a benchmark result in a single market.
4.2 The case of a single market
Suppose ﬁrms can choose among two levels of perceived quality ah and a`, with ah >a `. Firms ﬁrst
set perceived quality aim simultaneously and subsequently choose prices. The following proposition
conveys that, in a single market, both ﬁrms will end up positioning at ah.
Proposition 3 (Single Market) In the single market equilibrium both ﬁrms position at ah and
charge a price of c +2 µ. Proﬁts are equal to µ − K.
Proof: see appendix A
That is to say, given proposition 1 both ﬁrms choose to set perceived quality high. This will give
both players equal shares in the market and give the optimal prices in the market. As expected,
10proﬁts and prices rise in the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation.5 In other words, if horizontal
diﬀerentiation is eﬀectively absent, price competition will drive proﬁts to zero.
I now consider how the above result can be avoided as a function of a key reality of ﬁrm com-
petition in packaged goods, namely that ﬁrms meet in multiple markets that are characterized by
absence of consumer arbitrage.
5 Sustaining historical asymmetries through multi-market contact
5.1 Spatial concentration and horizontal product diﬀerentiation
The base-scenario analyzed in this section contains two ﬁrms, two markets, and two levels of perceived
quality: high (ah)a n dl o w( a`). For the moment, ﬁrms can increase perceived quality from low to
high at no cost. Firms each maximize multi-market proﬁts by choosing positioning aim ﬁrst, and
setting prices pim next. In addition, in a multi-market context, it is unnecessarily restrictive to limit
the analysis to one-period games. Therefore, ﬁrms are allowed to interact repeatedly in an inﬁnite
horizon game (Bernheim and Whinston 1990).6
Consistent with empirical observation, e.g., Figure 1, it is assumed that there is an existing degree
of spatial concentration in outputs. In the modeling framework, this translates in each ﬁrm being
endowed with one market in which it is the sole provider of a high perceived quality product and
one market in which it is the sole provider of a lower perceived quality product. This pre-existing
condition is exogenous to the analysis and its origins are therefore left general. The analysis therefore
applies to the persistence of any type of local advantages, even those whose origins are ﬂeeting.
Arbitrarily let ﬁrm 1 be positioned at ah in market 1 while ﬁrm 2 is positioned at a`. In market 2
the opposite happens. Denote the ratio of output of product 1 to that of product 2 at optimal prices in
market 1 by Φ ≡ s∗
11/s∗












21. From the deﬁnition of the ratio of outputs, it is therefore obvious that in market 2,
s∗
12/s∗
22 = Φ−1. By proposition 1, Φ > 1, i.e., in market 1, ﬁrm 1 is the product with the higher
5Soberman (2002) shows however that in a single market, if consumers diﬀer with respect to their awareness of
products, the monotonicity of proﬁts in diﬀerentiation may not hold.
6Comparisons to the single period single market game in the previous section are thus not immediate. However,
unless consumers accept the idea of each ﬁrm taking periodic turns at being the “high-quality” player, a single market
repeated game will result in the same equilibrium as the single period game.





· µ − K (8)









µ − 2K, i =1 ,2. (9)
If quality positioning is free, ﬁrm 1 is tempted in the short run to reposition from a` to ah in market
2. Because both products are then positioned at ah in market 2, the ratio of their outputs is 1. Thus,
t h eo n e - t i m ep a y o ﬀ of deviation for ﬁrm 1 is πd
1 =( Φ +1 )µ − 2K. Given this deviation, it is easy
to show that ﬁrm 2 now optimally repositions in market 1 from a` to ah. The payoﬀ for both ﬁrms
is now equal to π0
i =2 µ − 2K. Subsequently, there is no proﬁtable deviation for either ﬁrm. The
following proposition now holds:
Proposition 4 (base result)
1. There is always a mutual proﬁt incentive to sustain spatial concentration.
2. The minimum discount factor that sustains spatial concentration is equal to the ratio of each
ﬁrm’s smaller and larger output, i.e., δ∗ = Φ−1
3. The motivation to sustain spatial concentration decreases monotonically with the degree of
product diﬀerentiation.
Proof: see appendix A
The ﬁrst part of the proposition states that π∗
i > π0
i, i.e., that there is always a proﬁti n c e n t i v e
to sustain spatial concentration. This result is implied by proposition 2. Indeed, with asymmetric
positioning the positioning diﬀerence in market 1 is a1 = ah−a`, whereas in market 2 it is −a1. The
positioning diﬀerence when both competitors position at ah is equal to 0 in both markets. It follows
from the proposition that π(a1)+π(−a1) > 2π (0).
The second part of the proposition implies that existing spatial concentration is sustainable —even
when breaking it is free— as long as ﬁrms value future proﬁts suﬃciently. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm 1 does
not reposition if a periodic proﬁto fπ∗
i, is valued higher than a one time proﬁto fπd
i followed by a
periodic proﬁto fπ0
i. This valuation is met for all discount rates δ that satisfy
π∗
i(1 + δ + δ2 + ···) > πd
i + π0
i(δ + δ2 + δ3 ···). (10)
Hence, when











12ﬁrm 1 does not reposition. By symmetry, the same holds for ﬁrm 2. Given that Φ > 1b yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,
0 < δ∗ < 1. As a matter of interpretation, the more asymmetric existing outputs are, the less forward
looking managers need to be to sustain them.
The third part of the proposition is based on the result that ∂δ∗/∂µ>0. This result implies that
as markets are less and less diﬀerentiated, even myopic managers will sustain spatial concentration.
This is for two reasons. First, the proﬁt gains from improving one’s position in the weak market is
not large when there is no product diﬀerentiation. That is, the short-term incentive to deviate is
less. Second, the post-deviation drop in proﬁts from competing head-to-head looms larger in absence
product diﬀerentiation. Indeed, as the horizontal diﬀerentiation of the products diminishes, the value
of δ∗ tends to zero.
5.2 Duopoly with outside good
The previous analysis generated an unconditional result because it isolated one speciﬁc aspect of
multi-market competition, namely, that spatial concentration creates local market power for both
ﬁrms. However, it is likely that breaking the spatial concentration by positioning both products
at ah raises category-demand. To investigate which of these eﬀects (market power vs. demand
expansion) dominates, I investigate positioning and pricing decisions in the presence of an outside
good. Demand is now given by
sim = Nm ·
exp[(aim − pim)/µ]
exp[(a1m − p1m)/µ]+e x p[ ( a2m − p2m)/µ]+e x p[ V0/µ]
,i=1 ,2,m =1 ,2,
where V0 is the value of the outside good. As before, set Nm = 1 in both markets.7
Equation (6) still describes optimal prices given positioning. To facilitate discussion of the results
in the presence of an outside good, some additional notation is helpful. Let T stand for the combined
share of the inside goods (at optimal prices) when both are positioned at ah.Sis the combined share
of the inside goods (again at optimal prices) when one is positioned at ah and the other at a`.
Finally, among the inside goods, R is the share of the product positioned at ah if the other product
is positioned at a`, i.e., R = s1/(s1 + s2), if product 1 is positioned at ah and product 2 at a`.
Applying these deﬁnitions, s1 = SR if product 1 is positioned at ah and product 2 at a`, whereas
s1 =0 .5T if both products are positioned at ah. The following result holds.
7A more general result can be obtained using a nested logit model with separate nests for the inside and outside
goods and diﬀerent scale parameters for the choice among nests and the choice among the inside goods. The results for
this model are analytically very cumbersome without adding much insight. These results are available upon request.
13Proposition 5 (Outside good)
1. There is a mutual proﬁt incentive to sustain spatial concentration as long as the demand ex-
pansion eﬀects is not too large. More formally,
T − S<









TΦ − S (2 − T)
S (2 − T)Φ − T
where Φ = R/(1 − R)
Proof: see appendix A
The interpretation of the ﬁrst part of the proposition is as follows. The right hand side of the
inequality is always positive. Hence as long as T − S ≤ 0, the presence of a pay-oﬀ incentive to
sustain any existing asymmetries is guaranteed. However, the more interesting case is T − S>0
(demand expansion from both positioning at ah). The proposition states that as long as demand
expansion from both products positioning at ah is not too large, there is a proﬁt incentive to maintain
a reciprocal form of asymmetric positioning. Because previous research (e.g., Nijs 2002) suggests
that expansion eﬀects (at least those of price) are small in mature categories, this condition seems
met in practice. In addition, T −S is likely to be small for undiﬀerentiated products. If the products
are the same, then increasing the perceived quality of one of them while the other is already of high
quality should not aﬀect their cumulative demand appreciably. This is not the case for diﬀerentiated
goods where increases in perceived quality draw demand that is unique to each product.
The second part of the proposition shows δ∗ to be a rather complex function of S,T, and Φ. It
is noted that when the outside good gets smaller (and S and T tend to 1) the same expression as in
proposition 4 will obtain.
In order to illustrate when spatial concentration is more proﬁtable than symmetric positioning
even in the presence of an outside good, I use an example of proﬁts under spatial concentration vs.
symmetric positioning as a function of µ. Figure 2 shows the multi-market proﬁts at optimal prices
when ah =1 ,a ` =0 , and V0 = −1 as a function of µ. As is clear from the graph, for small degrees of
horizontal diﬀerentiation, the proﬁt incentive to sustain asymmetries is present and given suﬃcient
valuation of future proﬁts asymmetric positioning is an equilibrium.
Two aspects of the proﬁt curves are noteworthy. Proﬁts decrease in the degree of horizontal
diﬀerentiation, µ, for µ small enough. Thus, spatially concentrated industries with “intermediate”

































Figure 2: Multimarket proﬁts with symmetric and with asymmetric positioning
levels of product diﬀerentiation are less proﬁtable than industries without product diﬀerentiation (see
also Klemperer 1992 who raises a similar point). Point A in Figure 2 shows that proﬁts from spatial
concentration are 1 when there is no horizontal diﬀerentiation, i.e., µ =0 . Not until a relatively high
degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation, µ =1 .47, is there a multi-market policy with equal proﬁts (point
B). The intuition of the negative impact of µ on proﬁts is that diﬀerentiation on perceived quality is
more eﬀective when there is no actual horizontal diﬀerentiation between the products. The demand
eﬀect of positioning aim is ampliﬁed (dampened) by absence (presence) of horizontal diﬀerentiation.8
Second, in the presence of an outside good, the two proﬁt curves intersect (this is the condition-
ality in the ﬁrst part of proposition 5). Hence, beyond a certain degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation
ﬁrms are more proﬁtable when they both position as high quality players.
8While our main results so far are insensitive to the choice of a logit vs. linear demand system, the decrease in
proﬁts with increased diﬀerentiation is speciﬁc to the logit demand system and does not hold with a linear demand
system.
155.3 The case of M markets
For spatial concentration to be sustained, it was so far assumed that the ﬁrms are “balanced” across
markets, i.e., that ﬁrms are globally equally well oﬀ. This section investigates how imbalance across
markets still leaves ample possibility for local asymmetries to persist, even when the smaller ﬁrm
could obtain substantial demand expansion at the expense of the larger ﬁrm at no cost. I analyze M
markets, two ﬁrms, without an outside good. As before, existing positioning on perceived quality is
asymmetric. For historical reasons, ﬁrm 1 leads in L<Mmarkets. Firm 2 leads in M −L markets.
Again, without much consequence, Nm = 1 for all markets. Once more, aim can assume two values:
ah and a`. To simplify the analysis a1m = ah,a 2m = a` for markets 1,...,Land vice versa for markets
L +1 ,...,M. Denote the high share that is associated with positioning at ah when the competitor
positions at a` by R (R>0.5).
The following proposition is proven in the appendix.
Proposition 6 (M markets)
1. There is a mutual proﬁt incentive to sustain spatial concentration as long as within-market
dominance, R, is larger than across-market share of weak markets, i.e., (M − L)/M for ﬁrm
1, and L/M for ﬁrm 2.
2. This incentive condition becomes more easily met as the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation
diminishes.








Proof: see appendix A
The ﬁrst part of the proposition gives a surprisingly simple condition under which both ﬁrms
are better oﬀ with local asymmetries than with local symmetries: within-market share in the strong
markets, needs to be larger than across-market share of weak markets This condition is guaranteed
for the ﬁrm with the lesser amount of weak markets, but it poses a boundary condition on the
presence of a proﬁt incentive for the other ﬁrm. The ﬁrm with the smaller number of “strong”
markets therefore has a proﬁt incentive only if the asymmetries are strong enough. Indeed, even
with only one strong market (L =1 )aﬁrm may be motivated to maintain spatial concentration.
However, small asymmetries (those with R close to 0.5) will not be sustainable if competing ﬁrms
do not share an equal number of “strong” and “weak” markets.
16The second part of the proposition states that, in the case of M markets, as was the case for a
2 market duopoly, the proﬁt incentive to sustain asymmetries is more generally present when ﬁrms
are less horizontally diﬀerentiated. Technically, the smaller µ, the larger R.
The third part of the proposition focuses on the critical discount factor that sustains the scenario
of this section as an equilibrium in which one ﬁrm has L strong markets and one ﬁrm has M − L
strong markets. Mathematically, the discount factor is equal to the relative within-market share
(1 − R)/R in weak markets (at optimal prices) times the relative across-market share of weak markets
(M − L)/L. Given that this result only holds if there is a principle reason to sustain asymmetric
positions, this discount rate is guaranteed to be less than 1. The max operator in the third part
of the proposition expresses the condition that the ﬁrm with the lesser number of strong markets
is more easily tempted to attack in its weak markets. The result in proposition 4 that dΦ/dµ < 0,
implies that —as before— even relatively impatient managers will resist the short term temptation to
attack and increase their demand in “weak” markets when product diﬀerentiation diminishes.
6 The role of positioning cost: the case of retailers
6.1 A simple representation of retailers
To discuss the role of local positioning cost on sustaining multi-market spatial concentration, I use
a contextual example. This example interprets positioning costs as retailer fees paid by competing
ﬁrms in order to obtain “premium” shelf space. Admittedly, other interpretations of such costs, e.g.,
advertising costs, are equally judicious in the context of consumer packaged goods. To allow for
some generality in interpretation, positioning costs are modeled using two simple modiﬁcations to
the model.
First, slotting fees,9 promotion allowances, and alike are modeled as a (periodic) ﬁxed cost, K,
that does not depend on quantity sold. It is assumed that retailer support for ﬁrm i in market m
enhances the quality perceptions of consumers aim. The ﬁxed cost K(a)i n c r e a s e si na and is assumed
to be low enough for two manufacturing ﬁrms to enter in any given market. The latter accords with
the empirical fact that all local markets are entered by multiple manufacturers.
The second modiﬁcation is the introduction of a ﬁxed retailer mark-up. Prices are modeled as
9Slotting fees are meant here to capture “pay-to-stay” fees. Such fees are charged by retailers to manufacturers in
return for special treatment at the supermarket shelf. See e.g., Federal Trade Commission (2001).
17pim = wim +uim, where uim is the markup set by all retailers in market m and wim is the wholesale
price that is set by the ﬁrm. I use constant retailer mark-ups uim = u, because these retailer mark-ups
reﬂect intra-market competitive phenomena (e.g., competition between retailers) that do not likely
give rise to spatial concentration at the national level (for a similar simpliﬁcation, see Vilcassim,
Kadiyali, and Chintagunta 1999).
Exogenous slotting fees and markups are a useful approximation of the reality that retailers face
many diﬀerent product categories and therefore use heuristic approaches to setting margins and
slotting fees. Even with passive retailers, the model is informative about how the presence of costly
retailers might sustain spatial concentration.
6.2 Single market competition
Consider a single market (drop the subscript m momentarily), logit demand, no outside good, two
manufacturing ﬁrms, and the presence of retailers with slotting fees K(ai), and markup u.M a n u f a c -
turers ﬁrst set positioning simultaneously, and then simultaneously decide on prices. I again assume
that there are two possible levels of quality perceptions ah and a`. Demand for good i is equal to
si =
exp((ai − pi)/µ)
exp((a1 − p1)/µ)+e x p( ( a2 − p2)/µ)
(12)
with pi = wi + u. In a single market context, proﬁt for each of the manufacturing ﬁrms is equal to
πi = si (wi − c) − K (ai) (13)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, wholesale prices are equal to




Note that these prices are not the same as before. That is to say, the retailer mark-up is represented





− K (ai). (15)
Of initial interest is whether an asymmetric equilibrium in which one ﬁrms positions at ah and the
other at a` can emerge because of slotting fees K(a).
Asymmetric positioning Consider ﬁrst the case where product 1 is positioned at ah while
product 2 is positioned at a`.P r o ﬁtf o rﬁrm 1 is equal to π∗
1 = µΦ−K (ah), with Φ = s1/(1 − s1) > 1.
18Suppose ﬁrm 1 considers repositioning to a`. If so, it splits the market evenly with ﬁrm 2 (which is
also positioned at a`)a n di t sp r o ﬁts would equal µ − K(a`). Thus, ﬁrm 1 will not reposition to a`
as long as µΦ − K (ah) >µ− K(a`), with K (ah) >K(a`) because ah >a `.
Firm 2, positioned “low,” will not reposition if the payoﬀ of sustaining a` is larger than that
of repositioning to ah. This implies that µΦ−1 − K (a`) >µ− K(ah). By combining these results,




< ∆K<µ (Φ − 1), (16)
with ∆K ≡ K (ah) − K(a`). Note that µ
¡
1 − Φ−1¢
<µ (Φ − 1) iﬀΦ> 1, i.e. as long as the
product with the highest perceived quality obtains the highest market share (which is true given
our assumptions). Thus, there always exist slotting fees [K (ah),K(a`)] that make asymmetric
positioning an equilibrium.
Symmetric positioning With symmetric positioning at a`, the proﬁts for both ﬁrms are.π∗
i =
µ − K(a`). If either ﬁrm repositions to ah, proﬁts of that ﬁrm will be µΦ − K(ah). Thus, if ∆K>
µ(Φ − 1), then repositioning will not occur and a symmetric equilibrium with both ﬁrms positioned
at a` holds. Following similar logic, a symmetric equilibrium at ah is obtained when it is not proﬁtable
for either ﬁrm to reposition to a`. This happens when ∆K<µ
¡
1 − Φ−1¢
. In words, if it is cheap
enough to position at ah, all ﬁrms will do so.
The following proposition summarizes these results
Proposition 7 (Retailer — single market)








≤ ∆K ≤ µ(Φ − 1).
(c) Both ﬁrms position their products symmetrically at a` if ∆K>µ(Φ − 1).

















= {(ah − a`)/3,(ah − a`)/3}
Proof: see appendix A
The slotting fees K(a) can sustain an asymmetric equilibrium between ﬁrms in a single market.
Therefore this outcome can not be due to multi-market contact. Rather, in this case, the asymmetry
19is due to the inherent non-linearity in demand.10 The ﬁrst two parts of this proposition were discussed
above.
The second part of the proposition merits further discussion and interpretation. When product
diﬀerentiation is low, i.e., when µ ↓ 0, the diﬀerence in gross proﬁts (before positioning cost) between
the two ﬁrms in the unit-sized market tends to ah − a`. This statement echoes proposition 1 which
showed that price (and proﬁt) increases are never larger than the increases in positioning. Therefore,
the upper limit of the diﬀerence in slotting fees ∆K that supports an asymmetric equilibrium is equal
to ah − a`.
Conversely, when the category becomes more diﬀerentiated —as µ increases— positioning has less
inﬂuence on proﬁtability. In the limiting case of ever increasing µ, there can only be an asymmetric
equilibrium if (ah − a`)/3 ≤ ∆K ≤ (ah − a`)/3. In other words as the products are more horizontally
diﬀerentiated, no slotting fees (except in the limit K(a)=K0 + 1
3a)w i l ls u p p o r ta na s y m m e t r i c
equilibrium.









can be loosely interpreted as the gener-
ality with which an arbitrary cost function K(a),a>0, obeys µ
¡
1 − Φ−1¢
≤ ∆K ≤ µ(Φ − 1). If
the interval is wide, any cost diﬀerential will support an asymmetric market outcome as the only
equilibrium outcome. Conversely, if the interval is very narrow, only very small cost-diﬀerences will
support an asymmetric market outcome. Hence, again, asymmetric outcomes happen under more
general conditions when goods are undiﬀerentiated. The intuition behind this result is that when
goods are undiﬀerentiated, there is only “room” for one high quality player in the market. If two
products try to both be high quality players, neither of them will make enough proﬁts to make up
for the increased positioning costs.
6.3 Multi-market competition in the presence of retailers
I now consider the case of two markets instead of one. Retailers are again passive players, with a ﬁxed
mark-up and slotting fees, K(a), that depend on the level of support, a, given to the manufacturer’s
products. As before, I use a repeated interaction framework with inﬁnite horizon to explore the
multi-market nature of competition. In each period, ﬁrms position their products ﬁrst (either at ah
10Yarrow (1989) considers the speciﬁcc a s et h a tK (a)=e x p ( a). Not unlike this paper, he ﬁnds that asymmetric
equilibria are possible in a single market. For another instance of the latter result see also Moorthy (1988), who
makes the additional argument that the asymmetric equilibrium may be interpreted as a possible advantage of the ﬁrst
entrant. Both papers focus on asymmetric equilibria in a single market.
20or a`)a n dt h e ns e tp r i c e s .
Four possible positioning cases need to be considered. These cases are listed below.
CASE 1 ﬁrm 1 ﬁrm 2
market 1 a` a`
market 2 a` a`
CASE 2 ﬁrm 1 ﬁrm 2
market 1 ah ah
market 2 a` a`
CASE 3 ﬁrm 1 ﬁrm 2
market 1 ah a`
market 2 a` ah
CASE 4 ﬁrm 1 ﬁrm 2
market 1 ah ah
market 2 ah ah
All other possible combinations merely involve label switching of ﬁrms or markets and are there-
fore redundant. Case 1 (positioning low by all ﬁrms in all markets) falls under the previous proposi-
tion. If it is too expensive to position at ah in one market, it is also too expensive to position at ah
in multiple markets.
Case 2 can not be a multi-market equilibrium because it can not be the case (given µ and K(a))
that both ﬁrms position at ah in one market and at a` in the other. If positioning is cheap enough
for both ﬁrms to select ah in market 1, there is a proﬁtable deviation from both playing a` in market
2. Conversely, if advertising is expensive enough for both ﬁrms to choose a` in market 1, there is a
proﬁtable deviation from both selecting ah in market 2.
This leaves cases 3 and 4. For logical reasons, I focus ﬁrst on case 3. Firm 1 leads ﬁrm 2 in
market 1 and vice versa in market 2. At optimal prices the ratio of shares of the larger over the





µ − (K (ah)+K (a`)). (17)
A possible deviation for a given ﬁrm is to reposition to a` in the market where it was positioned
at ah. This deviation is attractive when positioning cost is high enough. However, if it is optimal
for one ﬁrm to reposition from ah to a` it is optimal for the other ﬁrm to do the same in the other
market. The optimality of this repositioning is therefore considered in case 1 and is covered by
proposition 7.
Another deviation is to reposition to ah in the market in which it was positioned at a`. If so, it
ends up with one market in which it positions at ah against a` by its competitor, and one market
where both ﬁrms position at ah. This repositioning will give to the ﬁrm that repositions the following
proﬁts
πd
i =( Φ +1 )µ − 2K (ah). (18)
21This deviation is attractive in the short run to the ﬁrm that repositions if the cost of positioning at






and ﬁrm i has a short term incentive to deviate. If this condition is met for one ﬁrm in one market,
it logically also meets for the other ﬁrm in the other market. Assume that other ﬁrm will then also
position at ah (I now obtain case 4). Upon this retaliation from the second ﬁrm, the proﬁts for either
ﬁrm will forever equal
π0
i =2 µ − 2K (ah), (19)
w h i c hi sl e s st h a nπ∗
i. Using the same arguments as those preceding proposition 4, case 4 will
not occur if ﬁrms value future proﬁts enough. These results are formally stated in the following
proposition
Proposition 8 (Retailer — two markets)
1. Wholesale prices are w∗
im = µ/(1 − sim)+c, i =1 ,2
2. When ﬁrms meet in multiple markets the following equilibria exist in the presence of a retailer




≤ ∆K ≤ µ(Φ − 1) then one product positions at ah and one product





i. if the value of future proﬁts exceeds δ∗ times the value of today’s proﬁts both ﬁrms
will sustain spatial concentration.
ii. if the ﬁrms are myopic, both products position symmetrically at ah in each market.
3. The minimum current value of future proﬁts that sustains an asymmetric multi-market equi-












Proof: see appendix A
The third part of the proposition implies that the presence of costly retailers generalizes the
existence of a spatially concentrated equilibrium. Namely, comparing propositions 4 and 8, δ∗ is
smaller in the presence of positioning cost than without it. Indeed, retailer fees make attacking
expensive and eﬀectively discourage myopic behavior by ﬁrms that would break spatial concentration
without positioning cost.
Figure 3 helps to interpret the proposition further. It outlines the equilibria that exist for an
arbitrary cost function K(a) (subject to the constraint that the proﬁts for both ﬁrms needs to be
non-negative) and degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation µ. This ﬁgure was generated, using a numerical






























zone I: symmetric positioning
at lower quality
zone II: asymmetric positioning
in each market
zone III: spatial concentration
with multi-market contact
zone IV: symmetric posit-
ioning at higher quality
Figure 3: Equilibria for product diﬀerentiation µ, and cost diﬀerential ∆K.
solver, for the scenario in which ah =1 ,a n da` =0 . Zone I outlines the cases where the cost diﬀerence
between positioning high and low is so large that both products position low in all markets. Zone
II represents the cases where a single-market asymmetric equilibrium exists. In this zone, a ﬁrm
may lead in both markets, in one, or in none. In none of these cases is there an incentive to deviate
in any single market. Consequently, deviations in multiple markets are also unproﬁtable. Zone III
identiﬁes when asymmetric equilibria are sustainable in two markets but not in a single market.
Here the cost diﬀerence between positioning high or low is so small that in a single market case,
all products would position at ah. However, in a two-market context, ﬁrms prefer to sustain spatial
concentration if they value the future enough. Figure 3 was created with δ =0 .75. Thus even if ﬁrms
only value next period’s proﬁts at 75% of current proﬁts, the area over which spatial concentration
is sustainable increases very substantially. Finally, zone IV contains all cases where ﬁrms position at
ah in all markets. As the ﬁrm’s value for future proﬁts increases, the fourth zone will diminish (as
an example if δ =0 .90, zone IV is no longer visible in Figure 3).
23Zones II and III combined give all cases where a spatially concentrated market equilibrium may
occur. The narrowing of these zones as a function of horizontal diﬀerentiation once more implies
that sustained spatial concentration as in Figure 1 is more likely to happen with undiﬀerentiated
than with diﬀerentiated goods.
Without further discussion it is noted that the introduction of an outside good does not aﬀect
Figure 3 substantively, as long as the outside good is not too large (see also proposition 5).
6.4 Do slotting fees harm ﬁrms’ proﬁts?
The previous proposition claimed that without positioning costs, spatial concentration can not be










In a retailing context, an interesting question now is whether proﬁts of such ﬁrms are harmed
by retailer cost such as slotting fees? Interestingly, the answer to this question is not always yes.
Speciﬁcally, for the cases identiﬁed by equation (20), ﬁrms do better with costly retailers than without,
if the proﬁt from the combination of spatial concentration and the presence of retailer fees is higher
than the proﬁt from the combination of symmetric positioning and no retailer fees, i.e., if
¡
Φ + Φ−1¢
µ − (K (ah)+K (a`)) > 2µ − 0, (21)
which alternatively can be rewritten as




It is clear that there exist δ and slotting fees K(a) that obey the conditions (20) and (22). For
instance, to obey (20) slotting fees should discriminate across diﬀerent levels of a. To meet (22)
slotting fees should not be too high, i.e., ﬁrms’ proﬁtability will be ultimately harmed by ever
increasing slotting allowances. The following proposition formalizes the conditions under which
ﬁrms may beneﬁt from the presence of retailers, and illustrates the dependence of these conditions
on horizontal diﬀerentiation.
Proposition 9 (retailers and incumbents)
1. For moderately myopic ﬁrms, i.e., 1
Φ − ∆K
µ(Φ−1) < δ < 1
Φ, spatial concentration is sustained only
by positioning costs.
242. For such ﬁrms, equilibrium proﬁts in the presence of positive positioning cost can be higher
than equilibrium proﬁts without positioning cost. This happens especially when products are
undiﬀerentiated, but not when products are horizontally diﬀerentiated.
Proof: see appendix A
The ﬁrst part of proposition 9 was addressed above. The last part states that as the horizontal
diﬀerentiation between products increases, the ﬁrms are better oﬀ with retailers only when these
retailers are free. Yet when products are very close substitutes, it is more proﬁt a b l et oh a v ec o s t l y
retailers —who sustain spatial concentration— as long as they are not too expensive, i.e., as long as
K (ah)+K (a`) < (ah − a`) (see the Appendix). An interesting link emerges to work by McGuire and
Staelin (1983) who found that as products become closer substitutes, ﬁrms prefer to shield themselves
from competition by selling through a retailer. In contrast to their single-market framework, the
result here relies on the fact that ﬁrms meet in multiple markets.
6.5 An alternative interpretation for advertising
The previous section analyzed the role of positioning cost in the context of shelf space allocations
or other retailer-support. Keller (1993) and Kirmani and Wright (1989) have argued that inferences
about product quality are alternatively aﬀected by advertising investments. Therefore, a short
discussion of the previous results in the context of advertising is appropriate.
In an advertising interpretation, positioning at ah (a`) translates into advertising at a high (low)
level. The cost diﬀerence ∆K is the marginal cost of advertising. The previous section suggests
there are three advertising cases to consider.
First, if advertising costs are suﬃciently high, nobody will advertise at ah.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
t h ec a s ei np r o p o s i t i o n7w h e r e∆K is large. Second, for intermediate values of ∆K an asymmetric
advertising equilibrium exists. In such an equilibrium, there is only “room” for one player to advertise
at a high level. The other player will realize that it is impossible to mimic the success of the ﬁrst
player given that this player occupies the ah position. It is therefore natural to think in this context
of a defensible ﬁrst mover advantage (see also Moorthy 1988). Finally, for really low values of ∆K
both ﬁrms will advertise if the decision makers are strongly myopic.
Advertising expenditures can increase ﬁrm proﬁts even if it does not increase demand, especially
for undiﬀerentiated goods. In proposition 9 it was shown that proﬁts with costly positioning can
be higher than proﬁts without costly positioning, even when advertising fails to generate primary
25demand. In an advertising interpretation, the proﬁtability of advertising comes from the monopoly
power it creates especially in packaged goods industries where goal functions of product managers
are moderately short term oriented (compare equation 20) and where products are undiﬀerentiated.
7 Discussion
The main result of this paper is that spatial concentration may persist especially for products of
undiﬀerentiated consumer goods. This idea was motivated by illustrating the surprising degree of
spatial concentration of weakly diﬀerentiated categories such as Mexican salsas. It was noted that
the same degree of spatial concentration holds for products such as ground coﬀee and mayonnaise.
However, a second result was that opportunities and/or incentives to sustain spatial concentration
are less strong when products are more clearly diﬀerentiated.
If the argument about diﬀerentiation is empirically important, local diﬀerences should not per-
sist to the same extent in categories with diﬀerentiated goods. An example of such a category is
breakfast cereals. That is, consumers will in general have little diﬃculty distinguishing between say
Kellogg’s Corn Flakes and General Mills Cheerios. More broadly, the product portfolios of the top
manufactures contain few if any products that are physically indistinguishable. Indeed, as Nevo
(2001) observes, the top manufacturers of breakfast cereals do not imitate each other’s products.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to claim that breakfast cereals are more horizontally diﬀerentiated
than brands of Mexican salsas.
Figure 4 shows the 1992 local shares of Kellogg and General Mills in the breakfast cereal market.
Compared to ﬁgure 1, the striking contrast between the salsa data and the cereal data is the absence
of spatial concentration. That is, whereas there are diﬀerences in market shares for each product
across markets they are only modest compared to the example of salsas.
This empirical example suggests that (lack of) product diﬀerentiation may impact the observed
degree of spatial concentration of an industry. It is not claimed that diﬀerentiation is the only
important factor. Speciﬁcally, cost eﬃciencies of spatial concentration or the presence of actors
whose decisions have spatial footprints (such as retailers or distributors) could well contribute to
spatial concentration. However, if the striking diﬀerence between ﬁgure 4 and 1 is any indication,
the degree of product diﬀerentiation does seem to play a role in the occurrence of spatial concentration
of ﬁrm outputs.
26Kellogg
min:0.29   max:0.45
Kellogg
min:0.29   max:0.45
General Mills
min:0.25   max:0.36
General Mills
min:0.25   max:0.36
Figure 4: Local market share of two leading manufacturers in cereals
8 Conclusion
There are many reasons why competing ﬁrms of undiﬀerentiated goods face diﬀerent initial conditions
in a given markets, e.g., order-of-entry eﬀects, pre-emption of mind-space (e.g., selective learning by
consumers) and shelf-space (e.g., selective availability of facings), etc. These phenomena can lead to
initial diﬀerences in market shares and proﬁtability. This paper has argued that even after the original
reasons for the asymmetries that arise from such initial conditions vanish, spatial concentration of
prices and outputs can be sustained despite immediate competition between goods. Two diﬀerent
explanations for this fact were presented.
The ﬁrst explanation is that multi-market contact provides a mechanism to sustain an implicit
geographical segmentation. As long as each ﬁrm has a large enough number of strong markets, or as
long as local domination is strong enough even in a small number of markets, there are no incentives
to compete for “fair share” in each local market once competitive response is taken into account.
The second explanation focuses on the possibility that ﬁrms can create a local form of vertical
diﬀerentiation through costly positioning of their products through costly agreements with retailers
or costly advertising. It was found that for a variety of positioning cost, there is “room for only one
high quality player in each market.” Thus spatial concentration in multiple markets can be sustained
if local positioning is costly. It is also shown that costly intermediaries such as retailers, may help
to sustain asymmetries by making it expensive for lagging ﬁrms to compete for “fair” market share.
27The contingency that spans both explanations is that sustenance of spatial concentration should
be expected especially when goods are physically similar, i.e., when demand side arguments for spatial
concentration are a priori weak. Surprisingly, if goods are the same, initial market conditions may
cast very long shadows, whereas if products are diﬀerentiated, these initial market conditions will
not be sustainable. Indeed, in the latter case, all competitors tend to compete for a “fair share” in
all local markets. Thus in undiﬀerentiated categories, “initial conditions,” i.e., launch strategies, are
very important and may initiate a market division that will resist change.
Provided that spatial concentration leaves both ﬁrms with at least some strong markets, this
paper further suggested that proﬁtability of packaged-goods catego r i e sd o e sn o tn e e dt or e l ye x c l u -
sively on horizontal product diﬀerentiation. Local asymmetries in product positioning on perceived
quality may suﬃce as a source of diﬀerentiation.
Finally, situations wherein category demand is high but market share is low, are oft seen as a
business opportunity (see e.g., Kotler 2003; Schultz, Martin and Brown, 1984). The results in this
paper are cautionary with respect to attacking in such markets. Speciﬁcally, in cases of spatial con-
centration a ﬁrm has to consider what will happen in one’s own high-share markets as a consequence.
The results in this paper suggest that spatial concentration may dissolve and all ﬁrms will be worse
oﬀ ever after. This is especially true in mature categories with a low degree of product diﬀerentiation,
i.e., for many packaged goods categories.
There are several limitations to this paper. First, I have analyzed duopolies in markets of equal
size. Whereas the consideration of oligopolies or markets of varying size will have some impact
on the results, such impact is small and perhaps of limited theoretical interest. Second, I have
focused mainly on sustenance of existing asymmetries. In future research, it is desirable to address
the emergence of concentrations in market shares. Indeed, given the opportunity of sustenance
of asymmetries especially when there is little product diﬀerentiation, the question of what causes
these asymmetries takes on some urgency. Third, empirically —and Figure 1 nicely illustrates this—
the patterns of share concentration are highly spatial. Given the regularity of the patterns, and
the degree of spatial variability of market shares, it seems important to study the origins of this
phenomenon.
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31AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 For convenience, drop all subscripts m.R e c a l lt h a t
s1 =
exp[(a − p1)/µ]
exp[(a − p1)/µ]+e x p[ ( −p2)/µ]
,a= a1 − a2 (A.1)
Some useful relations are ds1





µs1(1−s1). Taking the ﬁrst order
condition for ﬁrm 1 gives,
F(p1,p 2,a) ≡ p1 − c1 −
µ
1 − s1
=0 ( A . 2 )
The total diﬀerential of this function is Fp1dp1 +Fp2dp2 +Fada =0 . Writing Φ ≡ s1/s2, it is easy to
show that
Fp1 =1−
µ · d(1 − s1)
−1
dp1




It can further be shown that Fp2 and Fa are both equal to −Φ. Substitution in the total diﬀerential
for F gives
(1 + Φ)dp1 − Φdp2 − Φda =0 ( A . 4 )
Now, totally diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm 2.
G(p1,p 2,a) ≡ p2 − c2 −
µ
s1
=0 ( A . 5 )

























da =0 ( A . 7 )












1+Φ + Φ2 < 0. (A.8)
This proofs proposition 1. The result states further that changes in a are never priced by the ﬁrm
to the market completely. Indeed, it may be noted from the deﬁnition of Φ that the sensitivity of p1
to changes in a is always between 0 and 1. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 Once again, the subscript m is dropped from the notation. It
needs to be shown that the proﬁts of both ﬁrms are convex in a. Thus, the second order derivative














da2 > 0,i =1 ,2( A . 9 )
32To simplify the derivation, I can use the expressions in (A.8) and take the derivative of both expres-













(1 + Φ + Φ2)





(1 + Φ + Φ2)
2 > 0 (A.11)









=e x p [ ( −p∗
1 + p∗























1+Φ + Φ2 > 0. (A.12)
Substitution of (A.11) and (A.12) into (A.10) proves that the proﬁts of both ﬁrms are convex in
a. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 This result is implied by proposition 1. If both ﬁrms have high
perceived quality they both set prices of c +2 µ. These prices stem from p∗
i = ci + µ/(1 − si), and
from the obvious result that if both have the same positioning si =1 /2. It is easily veriﬁed that
there are no unilateral deviations from this proposed equilibrium. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4
1. The presence of the proﬁt incentive is easily derived from the comparison of total proﬁta c r o s s
the two markets under asymmetric market positions vs. symmetric positioning.
µΦ + µΦ−1 − 2K ≥ 2µ − 2K. (A.13)
The LHS is minimized for Φ =1 , which is the case of symmetry. Hence, the above inequality
always holds.
2. Proved in the text.
3. I need to show that dδ∗
dµ > 0 or equivalently that dΦ
dµ < 0a sl o n ga sΦ > 1. Deﬁne a = ah − a`,
and rearrange the deﬁnition of Φ at optimal prices to obtain the implicit equation that




1 −c = µ/(1−s1)=µ(1+Φ),p ∗
2 −c = µ/(1−s2)=µ(1+Φ−1). Thus, at optimal prices
the following relation exists,






















































(1 + Φ + Φ2)
, (A.17)
w h i c hi ss t r i c t l yn e g a t i v ea sl o n ga sa>0( w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u e ) . ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 :
1. I use the symbols S, T,a n dR as they are deﬁned in the text. Optimal prices are given by
µ
1 − s
, where s = SR in one market and s = S (1 − R) in the other. At optimal prices, the





S (1 − R)µ
1 − S (1 − R)
− 2K, (A.18)






Manipulating the inequality π∗ − π0 > 0 gives the result that
(T − S) <




2. Suppose the incentive condition holds and that both ﬁrms are positioning asymmetrically.









which is always more than π∗. Using that
δ∗ =
πd − π∗
πd − π0 (A.22)
gives the result ¥
34P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n6 :
1. Say R>0.5 in markets 1 through L. Then the proﬁt incentive condition follows from the
following comparison. If the ﬁrm stays in asymmetric equilibria it gets high proﬁts in market 1
through L and lower proﬁts in all other markets. If the ﬁrm is in symmetric equilibrium, then
it gets the symmetric duopoly proﬁts in each market. Formally, with spatial concentration














whereas in the symmetric case (R =0 .5), they are equal to
π1 = M (µ − K). (A.24)

















This condition is guaranteed for the ﬁrm that leads in the majority of markets. For the other
ﬁrm there is a boundary condition.









from which it follows that
R =
exp(a/µ − 1/(1 − R)+1 /R)







































thus if a>0t h e nR0 < 0. This means that if ﬁrm 1 is positioned advantageously, its share
will become larger as horizontal diﬀerentiation is further diminished (as µ goes down).
353. What holds for the minimal discount rate δ∗ in this case? A necessary condition is that the
proﬁt incentive to sustain the local asymmetries must hold. Therefore,
M − L
M































For ﬁrm 2, it is easy to show that
δ∗ =
πd − π∗







P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n7 :
1. Proof is the same as that given in the text preceding proposition 1
2. These statements are directly proven in the text
(a) It is obvious that limµ↓0 µ
¡
1 − Φ−1¢








1/µ2 =l i m
µ↓0
(ah − a`)Φ2
(1 + Φ + Φ2)
=( ah − a`) (A.38)
(b) Again, applying l’Hopital’s rule,
lim
µ→∞µ(Φ − 1) = lim
µ→∞−
Φ0
1/µ−2 =l i m
µ→∞
(ah − a`)Φ2













Φ2/µ−2 =l i m
µ→∞
(ah − a`)





This completes the proof. ¥
36P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n8
1. Proof is the same as that given in the text preceding proposition 1




≤ ∆K ≤ µ(Φ − 1)
one ﬁrm will position at ah while the other ﬁrm will position at a`. Because this result holds in
a single market, it will necessarily also hold for two markets given the lack of arbitrage across
markets. In simple terms, consumer demand is independent across markets, and therefore if
there is no proﬁtable deviation for the leader or the lagger in a single market, there is no
proﬁtable deviation in M markets, regardless of who leads and who lags or where.









where the exact expressions for πd
i,π∗
i and π0
i are given in the text preceding this proposition. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n9
1. These results are derived in the text.






























(1 + Φ + Φ2)
=( ah − a`) (A.42)
Following the same steps it is easy to show that limµ→∞ µ(Φ − 1)
¡
1 − Φ−1¢
=0 . ¥
37